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Abstract
This paper presents a model of urban traffic congestion that allows for
hypercongestion. Hypercongestion has fundamental importance for the costs
of congestion and the effect of policies such as road pricing, transit provision
and traffic management, treated in the paper. In the simplest version of the
model, the unregulated Nash equilibrium is also the social optimum among
a wide range of potential outcomes and any reasonable road pricing scheme
will be welfare decreasing. Large welfare gains can be achieved through
road pricing when there is hypercongestion and travelers are heterogeneous.
Anybody living in a major city will appreciate that congestion is a significant
issue for economic policy. For the US, for example, it is estimated that urban road
congestion in 2011 caused a total of 5.5 billion hours of delay (Schrank et al.,
2012). Congestion is not only costly. It also has impacts on the local economy,
it affects the functioning of labor markets, and it is an offsetting force balancing
urban agglomeration effects.1 It is therefore important for a range of economic
issues to understand the nature of urban traffic congestion.
Technical University of Denmark, Denmark, and Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden,
mf@transport.dtu.dk. I have benefited from comments by Ken Small, Jan Brueckner, Per Ols-
son, Jos van Ommeren, Antonio Russo, conference audiences in Atlanta, Copenhagen, Toulouse
and Stockholm, as well as support from the Danish Strategic Research Council. I am particularly
happy to have received many insightful comments from Richard Arnott.
1See, e.g., Duranton and Puga (2004), Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Moretti (2011).
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Traffic congestion is essentially dynamic: the traffic system has memory and
conditions at one point in time affects conditions later on the same day. Therefore
the timing of trips is fundamental and must be taken into account by economic
analysis. The dynamic aspect of traffic congestion matters also from a spatial
economic point of view due to the connection between the timing and the length
of commutes (Fosgerau and de Palma, 2012).
The seminal Vickrey (1969) bottleneck model has shaped our intuition about
urban congestion dynamics.2 That model describes queueing before a bottleneck,
for example located at the entrance to the central business district of a city where
drivers enter during the morning commute. The bottleneck allows cars to enter
only at a certain maximal rate. Drivers have similar preferences regarding when
they would like to arrive at work and therefore a queue first builds up before the
bottleneck and then dissipates every morning. In equilibrium, drivers trade off
the inconvenience of deviating from their preferred schedule against the time lost
queueing. The bottleneck model allows the inconvenience of the timing of trips as
well as the dynamics of congestion to be accounted for in the economic analysis
of congestion.
The defining property of bottleneck congestion is the constant capacity of the
bottleneck, which implies that delaying arrivals at the bottleneck can reduce de-
lays; nobody will arrive later, provided the bottleneck capacity remains fully uti-
lized. This feature of bottleneck congestion implies that a time varying toll can be
designed to induce drivers in the middle of the peak to delay their departures, such
that revenue is raised, queueing is reduced and no driver is made worse off. Arnott
et al. (1993) exhibit a stylized case in which an efficiency gain can be harvested
through the imposition of a time-varying toll that eliminates queueing and the ef-
ficiency gain is equal to half the congestion cost that the bottleneck imposes on
drivers in unregulated equilibrium. Drivers will be indifferent between the tolled
and the untolled equilibrium, all of the efficiency gain will be captured as toll
revenue.
Leaving the bottleneck, we shall now discuss flow congestion. It is well es-
tablished that the instantaneous speed at a single point on a road is a decreasing
2Vickrey’s paper is extensively cited and has spawned a lively literature on regulating conges-
tion dynamics, see de Palma and Fosgerau (2011).
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Figure 1: Fundamental diagram of traffic flow
function of the instantaneous density of cars at that point (Greenshields, 1935).
The fundamental identity of traffic flow holds that flow, i.e. the number of cars
passing the point per time unit, equals speed times density, where density is the
number of cars per distance unit. Flow is then (with appropriate shape restric-
tions on the speed-density relationship) an inverse u-shaped function of density.
On the upward sloping part we talk about congestion, as higher density leads to
higher flow but reduced speed. On the downward sloping part we talk about hy-
percongestion. Here higher density is associated with both lower flow and reduced
speed. The combined relationships between speed, density and flow are called the
fundamental diagram of traffic flow. This is illustrated in Figure 1.
A recent range of contributions have shown that such a fundamental diagram
of traffic flow also applies at the level of an urban neighborhood meeting cer-
tain conditions (Daganzo, 2007; Geroliminis and Daganzo, 2008; Daganzo et al.,
2011).3 The underlying mechanism is that drivers continuously adapt their route
choices to avoid more congested parts of the road network. This adaptation
process tends to equalize congestion across space. A stable relationship emerges
between the density of cars in the network and the space-averaged speed. This
is a very important finding, since it allows urban congestion to be analyzed in an
aggregate manner, without having to refer to specific road networks. I shall refer
3There is a second macroscopic relation named the network exit function (Gonzales and Da-
ganzo, 2012), which relates the rate at which trips are completed to density. I do not employ
this relationship as the model presented here produces the time at which trips are completed as a
function of departure times and trip lengths using only the macroscopic speed-density relationship.
3
to this type of congestion as bathtub congestion. Just like the water level is the
same everywhere in a bathtub, the level of congestion and hence the speed is the
same everywhere in an urban area subject to bathtub congestion.4 Figuratively
speaking, we can think of a car that drives a trip of a certain length in a bathtub:
It does not matter where it begins and ends it trip, its effect on the speed of other
cars depends only on when it is present in the bathtub.
The bottleneck model does not describe bathtub congestion well, since the
inverse-u relationship between flow and density does not occur in the bottleneck
model. Flow out of the bottleneck does increase with density before the bottleneck
until the point where the capacity flow is reached. At higher densities, however,
the flow does not decrease but stays constant. Thus the bottleneck does not gen-
erate hypercongestion.
Bottleneck congestion may be considered appropriate as a description of ur-
ban congestion for example concerning commuting flows towards a city centre,
where congestion is concentrated near the entrance to the centre. Given the now
existing empirical evidence, bottleneck congestion can no longer be considered
appropriate as a description of congestion at the urban level. For homogeneously
congested downtown urban areas, we now have empirical evidence that bathtub
congestion is an appropriate description.5
This paper presents a model that I call the bathtub model. The bathtub model
is similar to the bottleneck model in describing a fixed mass of homogeneous
drivers who care about the timing of their trips. The main difference is the con-
gestion technology embodied in the model. Where the bottleneck model builds on
bottleneck congestion, the bathtub model (unsurprisingly) builds on bathtub con-
gestion. Thus it incorporates hypercongestion., allowing increases in flow to be
associated with increases in speed. In this paper I show that the bathtub model can
4Richard Arnott has pointed out that I use the term "bathtub model" in the sense of hydrology
and he prefers calling it an isotropic model. Vickrey worked on what he also called a bathtub
model of congestion, which was based on the intuition that now materializes in Daganzo’s work.
Vickrey never completed this work but a note has been preserved (Vickrey, 1991). He used as
fundamental the idea that outflow from the bathtub is proportional to the height of the water in the
bathtub. This is similar to the second macroscopic relationship mentioned in the previous footnote
whereby the rate of trip completion depends on density. My model simply computes the times
when trips are completed as a function of departure time and speed.
5Ji and Geroliminis (2012) consider partitioning a road network into a small number of uni-
formly congested subnetworks (bathtubs). This paper considers just a single bathtub.
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be used to give a unified treatment of a range of issues related to urban congestion
and hypercongestion, as discussed in the following.
The bathtub model leads to conclusions that are radically different from those
of the bottleneck model. The bottleneck conclusions depend on the property of
bottleneck congestion that it is possible to delay departure times without affecting
arrival times. In the bathtub, such trip retiming has small or even no effect on
travel times under some circumstances. The underlying principle is illustrated
in Figure 2, which shows a short trip and a long trip in an urban area subject to
bathtub congestion. Each trip has some fixed length and a duration that depends
on the average speed obtained. The short trip is carried out within the duration
of the long trip; I call this regular sorting. The speed is low when both trips are
ongoing and high when only one trip is in progress.
Notice first that the duration of the short trip does not depend on the timing
of that trip. Under regular sorting, the speed for the short trip is always low.
Notice next that, still under regular sorting, the duration of the long trip is also
independent of the relative timing of the two trips: the long trip covers the same
distance as the short trip during the interval when both are ongoing; the remaining
distance is covered at the high speed, which is the same before and after the short
trip.
Section 2 generalizes this simple example to the case where there is a contin-
uum of drivers with a distribution of trip lengths and shows that travel times for
all trip lengths are completely determined under regular sorting. Thus the specific
departure and arrival time profiles do not matter at all for travel times. Under a
regularity assumption, it is shown that Nash equilibrium in the timing of trips is in
fact regularly sorted. Moreover, taking the travel time as given, each driver travels
at his optimal time. Since travel times cannot be reduced as long as regular sorting
is maintained, this implies that the Nash equilibrium is also the social optimum
among regularly sorted outcomes. Hence any policy that changes the departure
schedule can only make drivers worse off, if regular sorting is maintained.
Section 3 allows demand for car travel to be elastic in two different ways.
First, by introducing an alternative mode of travel. I call it "transit" for concrete-
ness, but the defining characteristic is just that it provides a speed that is attractive
when car speed drops due to congestion. Travelers have no specific preferences
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Figure 2: A short and a long trip with regular sorting. Durations are independent
of timing.
6
regarding mode of travel. In equilibrium, the availability of transit allows trav-
elers with short trips to escape from the lowest car speeds during the height of
the congested peak and instead travel at the higher transit speed. The remaining
car drivers are those with trip lengths above some threshold and they gain a speed
increase from the absence of the transit users. This mechanism is similar to that
described in Anderson (2014), who argue that transit users are those whose road
alternative is most congested and hence that their impact on road congestion is dis-
proportionately large. In contrast to previous transportation and urban economics
literature, Anderson (2014) conclude that the congestion relief benefits are large
enough to justify investment in transit infrastructure. This paper finds that it is
welfare increasing to induce a higher level of transit use than in equilibrium. A
tolling/subsidy scheme that achieves this can be very simple, it suffices to induce
more travelers to use the alternative mode and this can be attained by a constant
toll on car trips and/or a subsidy to transit use. If the transit speed is higher than
the critical speed below which there is hypercongestion, then hypercongestion
does not occur in equilibrium and the scope for achieving efficiency gains from
time-varying road pricing is then limited.
The second way of allowing for elastic demand is to introduce an outside op-
tion with a utility that is the same for all. Then a fixed charge per trip or a toll
that is charged at a flat rate will induce those travelers with the longest trip to
abandon their car trips; the remaining car drivers will experience higher speeds.
It is welfare increasing to have a positive charge or flat rate toll. This reproduces
the standard conclusion from static models of congestion that welfare can be im-
proved through pricing.
Section 4 extends the analysis in Section 2 to allow also for heterogeneity of
the trip timing preferences. Preferences are shifted in time by a constant, which
has some distribution in the population of drivers. Again under a regularity condi-
tion, drivers in equilibrium will sort regularly according to trip length within each
time shift group and they will sort according to the shift in preferences. There is
now a scope for achieving efficiency gains by changing departure patterns, which
arises due to the effect that travelers with different time shifts of their preferences
has on the speed of each other.
Figure 2 shows a short and a long early trip and a short and a long late trip.
7
Speed
Time
Short trips
Long trips
Figure 3: Two groups of a short and a long trip. Regular sorting within groups,
but not overall. Long trips overlap and durations depend on timing.
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There is regular sorting within each group. Still, the travel time depends on the
departure times in this case, depending on how much the long trips overlap in
time. Thus heterogeneity with respect to trip timing preferences makes trip timing
relevant for travel times, even if there is regular sorting within each group of
travelers.
The scope for achieving efficiency gains by affecting departure schedules is
investigated through a series of simulations of a congested demand peak at varying
levels of congestion. The simulations show that the scope for efficiency gains
from road pricing depends dramatically on the level of congestion, I examine
three cases.
In the least congested case, there is no hypercongestion. Road pricing achieves
a small welfare gain, but at the price of raising a revenue that is much larger than
the welfare gain. Thus car drivers will lose substantially from road pricing if
road pricing revenues are not returned to them. The intermediate case just reaches
hypercongestion at the middle of the peak when road pricing is not in place. In this
case, road pricing can produce a larger welfare gain but the revenue from pricing
is still much larger than the welfare gain. The flow profile is not much affected by
road pricing in this case, which means that simply counting traffic will not easily
reveal that road pricing has had any effect. However, the flow without pricing
results with a high density of cars traveling at a low speed, while the same flow in
the presence of pricing results with a low density of cars traveling at a high speed.
In the most congested case, the capacity of the bathtub is only slightly smaller than
in the intermediate case, but the congestion outcomes are quite different. Without
road pricing, traffic flow has two maxima, one at the beginning of the peak and
one at the end. In between, flow drops noticeably due to hypercongestion. Road
pricing maintains flow above capacity and thus produces a large welfare gain.
The revenue from pricing is a little larger than the welfare gain, which means that
drivers would still lose if revenues were not returned to them. Also in this case,
pricing has remarkable effects on the timing of trips. Travelers who ex ante travel
early in the peak are induced by pricing to travel such that they complete their
trips earlier than otherwise. Thereby they free capacity for travelers in the middle
of the peak, who then gain from higher speed. The increase in speed is so large
that capacity is also freed for the early travelers, some of whom can depart later
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than they would without pricing, even if they arrive earlier. The same, seemingly
paradoxical phenomenon emerges for travelers at the end of the peak who, in the
presence of pricing, will depart later but still arrive earlier than they would have
without pricing.
Section 5 discusses traffic management measures that are increasingly used to
avoid hypercongestion. Hypercongestion occurs when a higher density of cars in
the traffic network blocks road capacity, thereby causing flow, the total distance
driven per time unit, to decrease. Traffic management measures dealing with this
seek to place the high density of cars at places where it does not block road ca-
pacity: they turn hypercongestion into mere queues. This can be described in the
bathtub model and a simulation shows that the welfare gain from traffic manage-
ment may be close to that of road pricing.
I now turn to discussing some related literature. Arnott (2013) provides a
recent and comprehensive review of the bathtub literature. Here I review just the
part of the literature that is most closely related to the current paper.
Distance plays a very important role in the bathtub. Distance is, however, es-
sentially ignored in the basic Vickrey bottleneck model. Vickrey (1969) employed
so-called -- trip timing preferences, represented by a utility function that is
linear in travel time and separable in travel time and arrival time. Then driver het-
erogeneity with respect to distance to the bottleneck can be ignored. Arnott (1998)
combined a model of urban spatial structure with the -- bottleneck model; op-
timal tolling does not change transport costs for travelers so when the revenues
are not returned, optimal tolling will have no effect on urban structure. Fosgerau
and de Palma (2012) presented a model with more general scheduling preferences
where distance from the home to the bottleneck does matter and used this model
to analyze commuting in a city where workers live at various distances from the
CBD. In the bathtub, each driver has some distance to cover in the urban area and
there is an aggregate distribution of trip lengths, which matters for outcomes. In
this model, optimal tolling will have an effect on urban structure.
Arnott (2013) develops a version of Vickrey’s bathtub model, which is similar
to the present model in several ways. Arnott (2013) uses a linear speed-density
relationship to describe congestion technology while the present paper uses a gen-
eral speed-density relationship. The present paper uses general trip timing pref-
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erences that comprise the -- trip timing preferences of Arnott/Vickrey as a
limiting case. The main difference concerns the treatment of trip distance. Arnott
uses Vickrey’s assumption that outflow from the bathtub is proportional to den-
sity.6 This requires that remaining trip lengths at any time in the bathtub have an
exponential (i.e. memoryless) distribution. This assumption can be interpreted
as saying that each driver’s trip length is random with a certain distribution and
that drivers do not know their trip lengths at the time they make their departure
decisions, which is somewhat awkward. This paper merely assumes that drivers
choose departure time optimally knowing their trip length and the speed at which
they will travel and the physics of the model keeps track of the distance driven for
each driver. Arnott (2013) finds that the efficiency gain from congestion tolling
might be smaller than the toll revenue when congestion is light and larger, even
much larger, when congestion is severe.
Fosgerau and Small (2013) also analyze a bathtub type model. In their model
there is a bottleneck with a capacity that depends on the number of cars queue-
ing; tractability is achieved by simplifying the bottleneck capacity function to a
step function and there is no congestion outside the bottleneck. Unfortunately,
increasing the number of steps in the capacity function leads to a proliferation
of cases and Fosgerau and Small only analyze a two-step capacity. The present
model does not resort to such ad hoc devices and allows for a general distribution
of trip lengths.
Verhoef (2003) considers a model in which car travel a road that has a bottle-
neck in the middle. This leads to hypercongestion on the part of the road upstream
of the bottleneck. Hypercongestion does, however, not matter economically in this
model: the flow rate and speed inside the hypercongested queue do not matter for
the total trip time. In contrast, this paper is concerned with a situation where
hypercongestion is of first order economic importance.
Section 1 introduces the trip timing preferences, which are common to the bot-
tleneck and the bathtub models. Section 2 introduces the bathtub model. Section
3 allows demand to be elastic through the introduction of a transit mode and an
outside option. Section 4 introduces heterogeneity in trip timing preferences. Sec-
6Vickrey’s assumption has empirical support. It corresponds to the network exit function dis-
cussed in footnote 3.
11
tion 5 considers traffic management in the bathtub. Section 6 concludes. Proofs
omitted in the text are in Appendix B.
1 Driver preferences
We begin by formulating the travelers’ preferences for the timing of a trip. Let
h;w be real functions satisfying h;w > 0; h0 < 0 < w0 and h (0) = w (0) as well
as the technical conditions given in the footnote.7
The function h describes utility accumulated at the origin of the trip from
some initial time, set to zero at no loss of generality, until departure time a, this
amounts to
R a
0
h (s) ds. Similarly,
R 0
b
w (s) ds is the utility accumulated at the
destination from the arrival time until some arbitrary time, also set to zero at no
loss of generality. Let  be a toll payment and define utility as
u (a; b; ) =
Z a
0
h (s) ds+
Z 0
b
w (s) ds   : (1)
The marginal utilities of later departure and earlier arrival are positive and de-
creasing. There is a continuum of N travelers and they have identical trip timing
preferences represented by u. We are concerned with the interaction of congestion
dynamics with the timing of departures and regard N as fixed.
To talk about welfare, I assume a social welfare function that depends only on
the average utility of travelers gross of toll payment, that is, it depends only on the
average of u +  . This welfare measure will also apply when demand is allowed
to be elastic, since then there will be a fixed population of potential travelers who
will have an outside option with a fixed utility associated.
A range of different pricing schemes may be cast as modifications of the utility
rates. This is useful, since then the analysis with general utility rates applies as
well under these pricing schemes. A charge may be defined up to a constant
as  1 (a) =
R 0
a
1 (s) ds, which is a charge at the origin of a trip, as  2 (b) =R b
0
2 (s) ds, which is a charge at the destination, or as  3 (a; b) =
R b
a
3 (s) ds,
which is a charge while the trip is ongoing. Insertion of these charges in the
7The rates of change _h ()  @ lnh () =@t and _w () are bounded. The function (a; b) !
h0(b)
h0(a) w0(b) ;
w0(b)
h0(a) w0(b)

is bounded, continuous and Lipschitz.
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definition of utility in equation (1) may be cast as a modification of the utility
rates as follows.
u (a; b;  1 (a)) =
Z a
0
(h (s) + 1 (s)) ds+
Z 0
b
w (s) ds;
u (a; b;  2 (a)) =
Z a
0
h (s) ds+
Z 0
b
(w (s) + 2 (s)) ds;
u (a; b;  3 (a; b)) =
Z a
0
(h (s) + 3 (s)) ds+
Z 0
b
(w (s) + 3 (s)) ds: (2)
2 The bathtub model
The bathtub model considers car trips that take place on the roads in an urban
area where a uniform but time-varying speed S prevails, with speed at any time t
satisfying S (t) > 0. The part of trips outside the urban area is uncongested with
constant distance which is normalized to zero at no loss of generality. For a given
departure time a and trip length l, the arrival time b (a; l) is given implicitly by
l =
Z b(a;l)
a
S (t) dt: (3)
Denote by D (t) the number of drivers on the road at time t; in a real city this
quantity is proportional to the density of cars on the streets when the road network
is held constant. The speed-density relationship is  , where  > 0;  0 < 0, and it
relates the instantaneous speed to instantaneous density by
S (t) =  (D (t)) :
The speed is measured as distance per time unit. Density is the number of cars
driving in the area. The total distance driven per time unit is the speed times the
density, which is equal to the flow. The flow is thus the rate at which the total
distance driven increases.
There is a distribution of trip lengths l in the population of drivers. Let demand
 (l) be the number of drivers with trip length of at least l. This distribution is
absolutely continuous with c.d.f. 1   and density  =  0.
The arrival time b (a; l) for a driver depends both on the departure time a and
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the trip length l. We take for granted that departure and arrival schedules a and b
are differentiable functions of trip length. It follows immediately from equation
(3) that the partial derivatives of b = b (a; l) are
@b (a; l)
@a
=
S (a)
S (b)
;
@b (a; l)
@l
=
1
S (b)
:
Drivers are indexed by their trip length. If a (l) is the departure time for drivers
with trip length l then, denoting b (l) = b (a (l) ; l) ,
b0 (l) =
1
S (b (l))
+
S (a (l))
S (b (l))
a0 (l) : (4)
Define for convenience the functions
H (a) =
h (a)
S (a)
;W (b) =
w (b)
S (b)
;
expressing the utility rates in terms of utility per distance unit rather than utility
per time unit8, and note that _H (a) = _h (a)  _S (a) ; _W (b) = _w (b)  _S (b).
A main feature of the bathtub model is the heterogeneity with respect to trip
length. Through the first-order condition for the choice of departure time, it leads
to simple differential equations for the departure and arrival times, which will be
used throughout the paper. The first-order condition for the choice of departure
time for a driver with trip length l is
0 =
@u (a; b (a; l))
@a
= h (a)  w (b) @b (a; l)
@a
= S (a) (H (a) W (b (a; l))) (5)
The second-order condition is discussed in this footnote.9 The first-order condi-
8At the time of departure, the utility rate is h (a) = duda . The inverse of speed is the time per
distance S (a) 1 = dadl , such that
h(a)
S(a) =
du
dl is the rate at which utility is achieved per distance
(not) traveled.
9Omitting some function arguments for the sake of clarity, the corresponding second-order
condition is
0  S (a)

H 0 (a) W 0 (b) S (a)
S (b)

= S (a)H (a)

_H (a)  _W (b) S (a)
S (b)

:
This constrains how quickly the speed can decrease at the time of departure or increase at the
time of arrival.
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tion holds for all l and is equivalent toH (a (l)) = W (b (a (l) ; l)). Differentiating
the first-order condition with respect to l shows that
0 = H 0 (a (l)) a0 (l) W 0 (b (a; l))

1
S (b (l))
+
S (a (l))
S (b (l))
a0 (l)

:
If the second-order condition holds with strict inequality, then this can be solved
to yield the following differential equations for a and b.
a0 (l) =
_W (b(a;l))
S(b(l)) _H(a(l)) S(a(l)) _W (b(a;l)) ;
b0 (l) =
_H(a(l))
S(b(l)) _H(a(l)) S(a(l)) _W (b(a;l)) :
(6)
Together with the boundary condition a (0) = b (0) = 0, these differential equa-
tions determine the equilibrium departure and arrival schedules.
If a0 < 0 < b0 then shorter trips are carried out entirely within the duration of
longer trips. As mentioned in the Introduction, this is called regular sorting. It is
illustrated in Figure 4. Regular sorting is an analytically useful property. Under
regular sorting, D (a (l)) = D (b (l)) =  (l) ;which says that those on the road
when a trip of length l begins or ends are those with trips longer than l. Then, when
a trip of length l begins or ends, the speed is S (a (l)) = S (b (l)) =  ( (l)). By
equation (4), the travel time b (l)   a (l) then depends on trip length according
to b0 (l)   a0 (l) = 1
S((l))
. The driver with trip length l = 0 has a travel time
of zero and then the travel time profile is completely determined. This argument
establishes the following result.
Theorem 1 Under regular sorting and the specifications in this section, the travel
times for all drivers are completely determined by the speed-density relationship
 and by the distribution of trip lengths .
This result means that travel times do not depend on the departure schedule as
long as there is regular sorting. In the bottleneck model, in contrast, travel times
depend strongly on the departure schedule.
We shall use the following regularity assumption.
Assumption 1 In equilibrium, _H (a) < 0; _W (b) > 0 for all times a; b.
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This assumption is trivially satisfied when the speed is constant. It remains sat-
isfied if speed does not drop too quickly at times of departure or rise too quickly at
times of arrival. The assumption is not a primitive condition, as would have been
desirable, but depends on endogenous variables. The numerical results presented
below specifies h and w as exponential functions: in this case, Proposition 1 in
Appendix C translates the assumption into a straightforward bound on the slope
coefficients of h and w which is satisfied provided the slope coefficients are suf-
ficiently large. By construction, Assumption 1 is satisfied in Nash equilibrium in
the numerical example below. As stated in the following theorem, the assumption
implies regular sorting.
Theorem 2 Under Assumption 1, Nash equilibrium exists uniquely in the bathtub
model with heterogeneous trip lengths. Drivers sort regularly such that a0 (l) <
0 < b0 (l) for all l. Specifically,
a0 (l) = 1
 ((l))
w0(b(l))
h0(a(l)) w0(b(l)) < 0;
b0 (l) = 1
 ((l))
h0(a(l))
h0(a(l)) w0(b(l)) > 0:
(7)
The Nash equilibrium is socially optimal among departure schedules that main-
tain regular sorting.
Theorem 2 is proved in Appendix B except for the last statement which is
established here. Under regular sorting, the first-order condition for the choice of
departure time (5) reduces to
h (a (l)) = w (b (l)) : (8)
This is also the first-order condition for the choice of departure time for a driver
facing a constant travel time b (l)   a (l); hence all drivers depart at the time
that would be optimal if their travel time was fixed at the equilibrium value. By
Theorem 1, the travel time cannot changed given regular sorting. This implies that
the Nash equilibrium is the social optimum among the cases with regular sorting.
Before presenting the first simulation example, it is useful to make a few obser-
vations regarding the relationships between speed, flow and density under bathtub
(and flow) congestion. I use a linear speed-density relationship S = 1   D,
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which has a maximal speed of 1 and reaches zero speed at the jam density 1=.
A linear speed-density relationship is roughly in accordance with the empiri-
cal evidence in Geroliminis and Daganzo (2008). The flow-density relationship
F = SD = D (1  D) has maximum at D = 1=2; the corresponding maxi-
mal flow is F  = 1=4 and the corresponding speed is S = 1=2. In the congested
region, at densities less than the critical density D and speeds above 0.5, a higher
flow is associated with a lower speed. In the hypercongested region, at densities
above the critical density and speeds below 0.5, a higher flow is associated with
higher speed. We may write flow as a function of speed as F = S (1  S) =,
which is a parabola with maximum at S = S and which attains the value zero
when S = 0 and when S = 1. Any flow less than the maximal flow may occur
either at a speed smaller than S or at a speed higher than S.
Figure 4 shows departure and arrival schedules in a simulation of Nash equi-
librium; details of the simulation are given in Appendix C, which also shows that
the simulation is consistent with regular sorting. The speed drops by 70% at the
height of the peak when all drivers are on the road, which means that it reaches
hypercongestion.
The first panel of the figure shows the departure and arrival schedules, they
are regularly sorted. The second panel shows the speed profile. There is hyper-
congestion when the speed is below 0.5. The flow profile on the third panel drops
in the middle of the peak, which is again evidence of hypercongestion.
The simulation uses a uniform distribution of trip lengths. Then the slope of
the arrival rate schedule a0 is proportional to the rate at which trips are completed.
Observe that at the end of the peak, the slope of the arrival rate schedule increases:
this is a straightforward consequence of the decreasing density at the end of the
peak. This is inconsistent with the properties of the network exit function in, e.g.,
Gonzales and Daganzo (2012), which would say that the rate at which trips are
completed should tend to zero as density tends to zero. This is a reason why I de-
viate from the engineering literature in not assuming a network exit function that
relates the rate of trip completions to density. The present model tracks individual
trips from beginning to end.
Through simulation it has been verified that social optimum may not be regu-
larly sorted. When social optimum is not sorted, then finding the social optimum
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Figure 4: Simulation with regular sorting and hypercongestion
analytically is extremely difficult and probably impossible as it involves very com-
plex differential equations.10 A comparison of the social optimum to the Nash
equilibrium in the simulation example shows that the average duration of trips de-
creases by 0.24 time units from 1.03, but the average utility increases only 0.14
utility units corresponding to about 0.04 time units.11 Thus most of the travel time
gain is offset by worse timing of trips in this case. In contrast to equilibrium, the
social optimum does not have the first departure at time 0. Hence it is not possible
to implement the social optimum via a toll of the type  3 in (2).
10Equations (7) is a pair of ordinary differential equations. Without regular sorting the equiv-
alent differential equations would be a kind of delay differential equations (Kuang, 1993), but
where the increments a0 (l) ; b0 (l) depend on a; b at other values of l as well as on the inverses of
these functions.
11The marginal utility of travel time is computed in Appendix D. This is used to translate
changes in utility into changes in travel time. Computing the marginal utility of travel time re-
quires a little consideration since it depends on when the trip takes place and on how departure
and arrival times are supposed to adjust. The appendix computes the marginal utility change for a
trip with specific beginning and end times with the change corresponding to an increase in travel
time that maintains the ratio between the marginal utility of distance at the beginning and the end
of the trip. When the trip is optimally timed by the driver then this corresponds to the optimal
change in the timing of the trip.
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3 Elastic demand
We shall now extend the basic model of the previous section to allow demand to
be elastic. We shall do this in two ways. First, we introduce an idealized alter-
native mode of transportation. For simplicity, we call it "transit". The alternative
mode can be thought to represent public transport of some kind, in Copenhagen
or Amsterdam it could be walking or cycling, in Asian cities the alternative mode
could be moped. The main property is that it provides a speed that is better than
the speed achieved by car when there is most congestion. We shall see that the
presence of such a mode induces travelers with short trips to escape from the car,
thereby relieving road congestion during the middle of the peak which allows the
peak to be shorter.
The second extension we consider is to allow travelers to have an outside op-
tion with some constant utility. Then travelers with long trips will be first to
choose the outside option. This relieves congestion for all remaining car drivers
and the peak will again be shorter.
3.1 Transit
Travelers are still assumed to have the preferences specified by the utility in equa-
tion (1). Thus they do not have specific preferences regarding the transportation
mode but care only about the duration and timing of trips. For a given departure
time a traveler simply prefers the mode that provides the faster trip. The transit
mode is uncongested, providing a constant speed ST regardless of trip length. The
transit speed is lower than the free flow speed of cars but higher than the car speed
that results when all cars are on the road, i.e.  (N) < ST <  (0). This assump-
tion ensures that some but not all travelers will choose the transit mode. We have
the following result.
Theorem 3 Assume that transit is available. Let   0 be a fixed charge per car
trip. Under Assumption 1, Nash equilibrium exists uniquely. Both the group of car
drivers and the group of transit users sort regularly and the shortest trip length of
car drivers is not shorter than the longest trip length of transit users.
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Clearly, all travelers gain from the availability of an uncongested transit mode.
Without transit, transit users would have been driving at speeds less than the transit
speed. The same is true of car drivers, their speed does not drop below the transit
speed when transit is available. They cover the distance of the shortest car trip
faster than they would have if transit was not available and hence depart later and
arrive earlier than otherwise.
The same equilibrium emerges if the charge  is replaced by a subsidy of the
same size to transit trips. A charge may also be just partially replaced by a subsidy
and it is thus always possible to combine charge and subsidy to achieve revenue
neutrality.
The availability of transit also makes it relevant to consider again the potential
for welfare gains from charging road use. Consider the last car drivers to depart,
just before transit use begins. They have trip lengths just longer than l and their
average speed is slightly above ST , hence they do not want to change mode. If they
were somehow induced to change to transit then they would lose a bit of time, but
all the remaining car drivers would gain some time due to increased speed. This
argument suggests that it would be socially optimal to increase the use of transit
compared to equilibrium. The next theorem shows that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 4 Assume that transit is available. Under Assumption 1, increasing
transit use from the equilibrium level is welfare improving. The regular welfare
optimum may be implemented via a fixed charge applied to car drivers.
The social optimum may be implemented in a variety of ways. As has been
noted, it leads to identical outcomes (except for monetary payments) if a charge
to car drivers is replaced by a subsidy to transit users. It is similarly equivalent
to charge car drivers at a flat rate during the time of the shortest car trip or to
subsidize transit trips at a flat rate during the time of the longest transit trip. It is
even feasible to allow charges or subsidies to vary over time during these intervals.
The results concerning transit are now illustrated through some examples. A
range of simulations have been carried out, summarized in Table 1. The setup
of the simulations is the same as in Section 2, except now the transit mode is
included. The simulations are also illustrated in Figure 5.
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Table 1: Simulation results with transit
Sim. no. Transit Charge on Transit Last Utility Utility Avg. Min. car
speed ST car trips  share arrival min. mean duration speed
1 0 0 0 0.76 -4.61 -2.63 0.88 0.40
2 0.5 0 0.17 0.74 -4.43 -2.53 0.84 0.50
3 0.5 0.8 0.53 0.64 -3.63 -2.28 0.77 0.72
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Figure 5: Simulations with transit
In the first simulation, the transit speed is low, making the transit mode share
zero. The car speed reaches a minimum of 0.4, which means that there is hyper-
congestion, reflected in the drop in the flow at the middle of the peak. Simulation
2 sets a transit speed ST = 0:5, which is higher than the previous minimum car
speed and equal to the critical speed below which there is hypercongestion. No
charge or subsidy is applied. This leads to a transit mode share of 0:17 and a
minimum car speed that is equal to the transit speed. All remaining car drivers
achieve higher speeds than before. The third simulation sets the welfare maximiz-
ing charge on car drivers of 0:8, it is equivalent to a subsidy to transit users. This
increases the transit share to 0:53 and the minimum car speed increases to 0:72.
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3.2 An outside option
Assume now that all travelers have an outside option yielding a constant utility
u0 that is the same for all. Maximizing utility, they will only drive if their util-
ity (1) associated with driving is greater than u0. This setup has the immediate
consequence that it is the drivers with the longest trips who are at the margin.
Under regular sorting and a constant charge  or a toll charged at a constant rate
3 during the trip, the toll payment is higher for drivers with longer trips. Hence
the marginal driver is the driver with the longest trip also under these kinds of
pricing. In the model with homogeneous drivers, under regular sorting, there is no
efficiency gain available from affecting the timing of trips, but only from pricing
some of the longest trips off the road. This can be achieved by a constant toll
charged of all drivers. We obtain the following result.
Theorem 5 Assume that an outside option is available. Under Assumption 1, it
is welfare improving to impose a fixed charge  or a toll that is charged at a fixed
rate 3 during trips. The welfare optimum is achieved by such a toll.
A constant toll 3 > 0 drives the travelers with the longest trips to the outside
option. Hence speeds improve throughout the peak for all who remain on the road
and the peak will be shorter.
If both transit and an outside option are available, then it is welfare improving
to affect the margins for both long and short trips. A flat charge on driving would
however affect both margins. Therefore welfare optimum requires that transit can
be subsidized (or taxed) independently.
4 The bathtub model with heterogeneous preferences
This section extends the bathtub model in Section 2 to allow for heterogeneous
time shifts of trip timing preferences12, while maintaining heterogeneity with re-
spect to trip length. Recall that the utility rates are defined with h (0) = w (0) and
12This is analogous to allowing the preferred arrival time to be heterogenous under standard
      trip timing preferences (Vickrey, 1969).
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that this implies that a driver with zero trip length will depart and arrive at time 0.
We now introduce a time shift c and define
u (a; b;  jc) = u (a  c; b  c; ) ;
such that a driver with zero trip length and time shift c will prefer to depart and
arrive at time c. The following theorem uses a generalized version of Assumption
1 to allow for heterogeneous time shifts and shows that, in Nash equilibrium,
drivers sort on time shift c while regular sorting on trip length holds for each time
shift c.
Theorem 6 Assume that Nash equilibrium exists and satisfies _h (a  c)  _S (a) <
0 < _w (b  c)   _S (b) for all a; b; c. Then, for fixed c, drivers sort regularly in
equilibrium and, for fixed l, the departure time is increasing as a function of c.
Think of drivers as being grouped according to their time shift c and restrict
attention to cases with regular sorting. With just one group we have seen that it
is not possible to reduce travel times by changing departure times without going
outside regular sorting. With more time shift groups having trips that overlap in
time, departure times can be changed to reduce the amount of overlap between
groups while maintaining regular sorting. Hence there is a scope for achieving
a welfare gain from tolling in this case if drivers with small c (those who prefer
early trips) can be induced to depart earlier, and conversely drivers with large c
can be induced to depart later, since then speed will increase while those in the
middle are traveling.
We shall investigate this using simulation, now including a uniform distribu-
tion of time shifts c on the interval [ 1; 1]. If we interpret the time unit as hours
then the simulation could describe a commuting peak that in the absence of con-
gestion would last from 6.30am to 9.30am with the shortest trips taking place
during 7-9 am. Congestion increases the duration of the peak. The speed-density
relationship is again linear. The slope is set to produce varying degrees of con-
gestion. This is equivalent to changing the size of the population. We shall look
at three sets of simulations, distinguished just by the slope of the speed-density
relationship.
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The simulations are carried out by first computing the departure and arrival
times for each c using the differential equations (6) derived from the first-order
condition, taking a speed profile S as given. The corresponding second-order
condition is verified. Then the speed profile is updated using the resulting depar-
ture and arrival schedules to compute a new density profile, which then leads to a
new speed profile. These steps are repeated until the speed profile is constant to
a high degree of precision. The simulation allows for modification of the utility
rates by tolling as discussed in Section 1. Regular sorting is not imposed on the
simulations but results anyway for most travelers.
Each set of simulations comprises two scenarios, a base scenario and a tolled
scenario. The base scenario is equilibrium without any regulation. This is com-
pared the tolled scenario, which is equilibrium in the presence of a toll  3 charged
during trips. The toll  3 is computed to approximate the welfare optimal toll.13
Figure 6 shows the first set of simulations with light congestion corresponding
to a maximum flow of 0.25. The first panel shows departure and arrival schedules
for the travelers with c =  1; 0 and 1, the second panel shows the speed profiles
and the third shows the flow profiles. The flow at a point in time is the rate of
increase of the total distance driven by all vehicles in the system and hence the
area under the flow profile is the total distance driven, which is constant in these
simulations.
In the base scenario, the speed reaches a minimum of around 0.7 so there is no
hypercongestion. The flow profile is unimodal. Introducing the toll causes early
travelers to depart and arrive earlier and late travelers to depart and arrive later.
The flow profile becomes flatter and more spread out. The speed is decreased
on the shoulders of the peak and increased in the middle. Table 2 summarizes
the welfare consequences of the charge for the three sets of simulations. The
first column shows the critical flow F , which is set by design for each set of
simulations and which is the only parameter that distinguishes between them. The
second column shows the minimum speed that is reached in each simulation. We
13The toll 3 is continuous and piecewise linear with eight equidistant separation points in the
interval [ 2; 2]. It is is zero outside this interval. The toll is restricted to be symmetric since
the trip timing preferences are symmetric in time in the simulation; this implies that the toll is
described by four parameters for the values of 3 at the separation points. The toll was identified
in a search in the welfare increasing direction over a four-dimensional grid of parameter values.
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Table 2: Simulation results
Sim. Max. flow Min. speed Gross util. change Toll rev. Ratio
(2) (3) (3)/(2)
1 base 0.250 0.68
1 toll 0.250 0.72 0.031 0.716 23.4
2 base 0.167 0.38
2 toll 0.167 0.60 0.845 2.415 2.86
3 base 0.156 0.24
3 toll 0.156 0.59 2.883 3.061 1.06
recall that the limit between congestion and hypercongestion is at the critical speed
0.5. The third column shows the average utility gross of toll, which is also the
welfare measure. The fourth column shows the toll revenue per driver. Utility is
money-metric such that these figures are comparable. The last column shows the
ratio of toll revenue to the change in gross utility.
In the first simulation, the charge leads to a welfare gain of 0.03 but the toll
revenue is 23 times larger. Thus car drivers pay a high price for a relatively small
welfare gain in this situation.
The second set of simulations in Figure 7 concern a setting with a moderate
level of congestion with a maximum flow of 0.17. The slope of the speed-density
relationship is set such that the speed drops to about 0.4 in the base scenario,
which means that hypercongestion occurs. The flow profile is a little bit bimodal,
reflecting that flow drops during the middle of the peak due to hypercongestion.
As under light congestion, the toll causes early travelers to complete their trips
even earlier and conversely for late travelers. This reduces the density such that
hypercongestion does not occur in the tolled scenario and speeds are increased
substantially during the middle of the peak. The total duration of the peak is
hardly affected by the toll - traffic is redistributed within the peak but it does not
become much longer: early travelers depart a little bit earlier but arrive much
earlier, conversely for later travelers, travelers in the middle travel much faster.
The flow profile, however, changes only a little. This reflects the fact that the
same flow can occur both at a high speed and at a low speed. The welfare gain
from tolling is 0.85, much higher than under light congestion, and the toll revenue
is 2.86 times the welfare gain, so that the price paid by car drivers is not so extreme
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Figure 6: Simulation with heterogeneous time shifts and light congestion
relative to the welfare gain, but still higher.
The third set of simulations in Figure 8 concern a setting with a high level of
congestion. The maximum flow of 0.16 is actually only slightly smaller than in
the previous simulation, but the dynamics of congestion cause speed to drop sub-
stantially compared to the previous simulation. Speed now drops to around 0.25 in
the base scenario and the bimodality of the flow profile is quite pronounced. With
congestion this strong, the effect of the toll is quite remarkable. Early travelers ar-
rive earlier and late travelers arrive later. This leaves room for the travelers in the
middle who achieve much higher speeds and hypercongestion is removed. The
travelers in the middle now occupy capacity for a much shorter time and hence
they interact less with travelers on the shoulders of the peak. The speed is then
increased so much for the travelers on the shoulders that some early travelers can
depart later in the tolled scenario than in the base, even if they arrive earlier. The
net result is a peak that is shorter than in the base scenario, even if the speed in-
crease is achieved by inducing travelers to spread out in time. The welfare gain is
2.9, which is much higher than before. The toll revenue is 1.1 times the welfare
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Figure 7: Simulation with heterogeneous time shifts and moderate congestion
gain so travelers would experience a net loss from tolling if toll revenues were not
returned.
5 Turning hypercongestion into queues
As we have seen, congestion becomes very costly when it reaches the level of
hypercongestion. Hypercongestion occurs when the density of cars becomes so
large that it reduces the flow of traffic. In concrete physical terms this can hap-
pen for example at a turn lane on a freeway that leads to some bottleneck such
as a traffic light. If the flow into the turn lane exceeds the capacity at the bottle-
neck then a queue will build. Eventually the queue will spill back on the freeway
and reduce flow for traffic that does not use the turn lane. Traffic management
measures for such a situation include lengthening the turn lane to avoid the queue
reaching the freeway or increasing the bottleneck capacity, perhaps by increasing
the green time for traffic leaving the freeway.
Another type of situation is capacity drop at a merge on a freeway (Cassidy
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Figure 8: Simulation with heterogeneous time shifts and heavy congestion
and Rudjanakanoknad, 2005). A high level of merging traffic leads to a merge
queue. This queue induces lane changing behavior, which causes the queue to
spread laterally into the freeway and flow out of the merge is reduced. A traffic
management strategy here is ramp metering, whereby the volume of merging traf-
fic is metered to avoid the capacity drop. Metering moves queueing upstream of
the merge and thereby avoids hypercongestion at the merge.
In urban street networks, spill backs can lead to hypercongestion when queues
become so long that flows through intersections are reduced. Traffic management
may reduce such problems by, e.g., using traffic lights that adapt to the length of
the queues on the different roads that lead into intersections (Gershenson, 2005;
de Gier et al., 2011; Gershenson and Rosenblueth, 2012). Then priority can be
given flows such that intersection capacity is better utilized while spillbacks can
be minimized.
These examples have in common that excessive densities of cars at critical
locations impede traffic flow. The traffic management strategies to deal with such
situations involve essentially directing the high densities to places where they do
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Figure 9: Simulation with heterogeneous time shifts, with and without hypercon-
gestion
not impede traffic flow. Thus hypercongestion is converted into mere queues.
The effect of traffic management can be illustrated using the simulation model
of the previous section. I will compare the most congested example to a situation
in which flow does not decrease at all at high densities. This is a stark contrast that
shows the potential if hypercongestion can be completely avoided through traffic
management.
The simulation in this section compares two scenarios. The first is the same
as shown in Figure 8 with toll applied. The second is the same except it has a
modified relationship between flow and density. The relationship is the same as
before at densities below the critical density. At higher densities, the relationship
is modified such that flow remains equal to the maximum flow. This is achieved
by modifying the speed-density relationship into
 (D) =
(
1  D; D  1
2
1
4D
; D > 1
2
:
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Then speed decreases as density increases but flow remains constant at 1=4 at
high densities.
Figure 9 shows the simulation results. Removing hypercongestion causes flow
not to drop, even if speed still drops below the critical speed that would otherwise
be associated with the transition to hypercongestion. Speeds improve such that the
duration of the peak becomes shorter. This enables all drivers to depart later and/or
arrive earlier. The welfare gain associated with the removal of hypercongestion
is 1.98, which can be compared to the welfare gain from road pricing of 2.88
obtained in the third simulation above. Thus most of the welfare gain that was
obtained from pricing can be obtained from traffic management given that traffic
management is able to remove hypercongestion.
A possible concern with this simulation is that density might increase to a
level that would be infeasible due to space constraints. It turns out in this case that
removing hypercongestion actually reduces the equilibrium density at all times
during the peak. There are two opposing forces in action. One force is that the
speed increase induces trips to concentrate more in time, i.e. early departures will
occur later and conversely for late arrivals. This force tends to increase density
in the middle of the peak. The opposing force is that trips are completed faster
under the higher speed, so that each trips contributes to the density for a shorter
duration. The latter effect dominates in this simulation.
6 Conclusion
This paper has contributed a tractable bathtub model, employing a physically real-
istic description of congestion dynamics in a downtown area where a macroscopic
relationship between speed and density prevails. The bathtub model allows for
hypercongestion and can be used as a unified framework to analyze a range of
issues. The model leads to a number of conclusions that do not arise in the bot-
tleneck model and demonstrates the importance of taking hypercongestion into
account.
There are a number of unresolved questions that may be asked of the model
presented here. These questions are not easy and their answers require new in-
sights beyond what has been established in this paper. In the model with homo-
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geneous drivers (Section 2), we may ask what happens if Condition 1 that leads
to regular sorting is violated. Does equilibrium still exist in this case? Another
question, raised by Richard Arnott, is whether hypercongestion can exist in social
optimum. Assuming for a moment that social optimum involves hypercongestion,
then if the distribution of trip lengths allows it, it seems plausible that it is possi-
ble to rearrange the departure schedule to avoid exceeding the critical density that
leads to hypercongestion while maintaining the same flow but at higher speeds and
lower densities. This possibility would contradict that a departure schedule lead-
ing to hypercongestion could be socially optimal. More generally, we may ask for
conclusions regarding existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and social
optimum. These are difficult questions due to the complexity of delay differential
equations.
There are several directions in which it is relevant and perhaps feasible to ex-
tend the current model. One direction is to introduce some spatial differentiation,
perhaps by allowing multiple connected bathtubs. Another is to connect to urban
economics models such as the monocentric city model. There is the issue of uncer-
tainty, since random variability is a major aspect of congestion. Finally, of course,
more may be done to allow for traveler heterogeneity. I am sure these directions
do not exhaust the possibilities for extension and application of the bathtub model.
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A Notation
Symbol Definition
s; t Points in time
S (t) Speed at time t
D (t) Density of cars at time t
 (D) Speed-density relationship in general form, linear form S =
1  D used in simulations
h (t) ; w (t) Utility rate at the origin and at the destination
0; 1; 0; 1 Parameters in specific form, h (s) = exp (0   1s),
w (s) = exp (0 + 1s)
H (t) = h(t)
S(t)
;W (t) = w(t)
S(t)
Utility rates in distance terms
u Utility
 Toll
 Toll rate
N Number of drivers
l Trip length
; ( =  0) Survivor functions for trip length in the model with hetero-
geneous trip lengths
_x (t) = x
0(t)
x(t)
Dot above a function of time denotes rate of change
a; b Departure and arrival times
B Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2 . The first-order condition for utility maximization for a
driver with trip length l taking the speed profile S as given is (5) and by Assump-
tion 1 the corresponding second-order condition (footnote 9) is satisfied with strict
inequality.
The first-order condition holds for all l and is equivalent toH (a (l)) = W (b (a (l) ; l)).
From (6), Assumption 1 implies that a0 (l) < 0 < b0 (l) for all l such that regular
sorting applies. Using equation (8), this can be simplified to obtain the expression
in equations (7) stated in the theorem. Finally, equations (7) is a pair of differen-
tial solutions with initial condition a (0) = b (0) = 0. This system has a unique
solution given our requirements on h;w (Taylor, 2011).
Proof of Theorem 6. Consider some fixed trip length l. The first-order condition
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for the choice of departure time a (ljc) is
0 =
h (a (ljc)  c)
S (a (ljc))  
w (b (a (ljc) ; l)  c)
S (b (a (ljc) ; l)) :
For visual clarity, write a for a (ljc) and b for b (a (ljc) ; l). The second-order
condition is (using the first-order condition)
SOC  h (a  c)
S (a)

_h (a  c)  _S (a)  S (a)
S (b)

_w (b  c)  _S (b)

< 0:
Differentiate the first-order condition with respect to c to find
0 = SOC
@a
@c
  h (a  c)
S (a)

_h (a  c)  _w (b  c)

;
which yields
@a
@c
=
_h (a  c)  _w (b  c)
_h (a  c)  _S (a)  S(a)
S(b)

_w (b  c)  _S (b)
 ;
which is strictly positive as required.
Now fix c, differentiate the first-order condition with respect to l and rearrange
to find
@a
@l
=
_w (b  c)  _S (b)
S (b)

_h (a  c)  _S (a)

  S (a)

_w (b  c)  _S (b)

@b
@l
=
_h (a  c)  _S (a)
S (b)

_h (a  c)  _S (a)

  S (a)

_w (b  c)  _S (b)
 :
Then there is regular sorting for each c under the assumptions of the Theorem.
Prof of Theorem 3. The number of car drivers is strictly between 0 and N , since
otherwise somebody could change mode and gain. The car drivers do not interact
with the transit users, and so Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 apply to them. Then
the road speed profile S is U-shaped and reaches a minimum for the duration of
the shortest car trip where the density is equal to the mass of car drivers. The
minimum car driver speed is greater than the transit speed. Due to sorting, a
driver with a longer trip experiences higher average speed than the shortest car
trip. Hence all travelers with longer trips than the minimum car trip length will go
by car. and   1 (ST ) =  (lT ).
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Proof of Theorem 4. Consider equilibrium with transit where all travelers with
trip length less than l use transit and all others use car. Denote byD =  (l) the
number of car drivers. We shall investigate the effect of changing the threshold l.
Let aC ; bC denote departure and arrival schedules for car drivers and let aT ; bT
be those for transit users. Aggregate welfare is
W =
Z l
0
u (aT (l) ; bT (l)) (l) dl +
Z 1
l
u (aC (l) ; bC (l)) (l) dl:
Departures are optimally chosen so we may appeal to enveloping and ignore the
effect of l on departures. Arrivals are given by physics. A marginal increase in l
of dl shifts a mass of  (l) dl out of car into transit. The speed for the remaining
car drivers increases by  0 ( (l)) (l) dl during the interval [aC (l) ; bC (l)],
such that they cover the distance l earlier by  0 ( (l)) (l) (bC (l)  aC (l)) dl
time units. Hence,
@bC (l)
@l
=  0 ( (l)) (l) (bC (l)  aC (l)) :
Denote u = u (aT (l) ; bT (l))   u (aC (l) ; bC (l)) and differentiate the
welfare measure with respect to l to find
@W
@l
=  (l) u+
Z l
0
@
@l
Z 0
bT (l)
w (s) ds

 (l) dl +
Z 1
l
@
@l
Z 0
bC(l)
w (s) ds

 (l) dl
=  (l) u 
Z l
0
w (bT (l))
@bT (l)
@l
 (l) dl  
Z 1
l
w (bC (l))
@bC (l)
@l
 (l) dl
The travel time for transit users is unaffected, so this reduces to
@W
@l
=  (l) u 
Z 1
l
w (bC (l))
@bC (l)
@l
 (l) dl:
Inserting the expression for @bC(l)
@l leads to
@W
@l
=  (l) u   0 ( (l)) (l) (bC (l)  aC (l))
Z 1
l
w (bC (l)) (l) dl:
When l = lT , then u = 0 and so @W@l  0. If also  0 ( (lT )) < 0 then
@W
@l > 0.
It remains to be shown that the regular welfare optimum may be implemented
through a fixed charge on car drivers. So consider the welfare optimum. Car
drivers and transit users do not interact, so the group of car drivers must also be in
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welfare optimum when considered in isolation. By Theorem 2, car drivers must
be in Nash equilibrium. A similar argument shows that transit users must also be
in Nash equilibrium. It must also be the case that car drivers have longer trips than
transit users. Then it only remains to see that a fixed charge  on car users may be
set to achieve to optimum number of car drivers and transit users.
Proof of Theorem 5. We shall consider the case of a constant rate toll 3, the
case of a fixed charge  is completely analogous. Utility is given by (2). Regular
sorting holds among car drivers as before and Theorem 2 remains valid, since
03 = 0. Equilibrium utility is then decreasing in trip length. This implies that
there is a threshold trip length l that separates car drivers from those who choose
the outside option. The threshold decreases as 3 increases.
A marginal increase in l of dl shifts  (l) dl drivers onto the road which
affects all drivers with shorter trips. Note that
b0 (l)  a0 (l) = 1
 ( (l)   (l))
b (l)  a (l) =
Z l
0
1
 ( (l)   (l0))dl
0
@ (b (l)  a (l))
@l
=  (l)
Z l
0
 0 ( (l)   (l0))
 ( (l)   (l0))2
dl0
and this is negative when  0 ( (l)   (l0)) < 0.
Welfare is
W =
Z l
0
u (a (l) ; b (l)) (l) dl +  (l)u0:
Differentiate welfare to get
@W
@l
= [u (a (l) ; b (l))  u0] (l) 
Z l
0
h (a (l))
@ (b (l)  a (l))
@l
 (l) dl: (9)
Evaluate at the no toll equilibrium point where u (a (l) ; b (l)) = u0. The first
term in (9) is then zero such that
@W
@l
ju(a(l);b(l))=u0 < 0:
This establishes that it is welfare improving to price some drivers off the road
compared to no-toll equilibrium. The conclusion that welfare optimum is achieved
for some toll rate 3 follows from 2.
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C Simulation details
The simulations specify h and w as exponential functions
h (s) = exp (0   1s) ; w (s) = exp (0 + 1s) ; (10)
where 1; 1 > 0, then _h (s) = h0 (s) =h (s) =  1 and _w (s) = w0 (s) =w (s) =
1. Thus this specification satisfies the requirements made on h and w.
The simulations use N = 1, 0 = 0, 1 = 1 = 2, trip lengths that are
uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and the speed density relationship  (D) = 1 D.
The speed-density relationship leads to a maximal speed drop of .
Proposition 1 Assume that
11
1 + 1
>   0 ( (l)) (l) : (11)
The Nash equilibrium in the bathtub model with homogeneous drivers and the
specification just stated is given by
a (0) = b (0) = 0;
a0 (l) =   1
 ( (l))
1
1 + 1
; b0 (l) =
1
 ( (l))
1
1 + 1
Proof. There will be sorting by construction and hence the speed is S (a (l)) =
S (b (l)) =  ( (l)). It is straightforward that l =
R b(l)
a(l)
S (t) dt. The first-
order condition for utility maximization, h (a (l)) = w (b (l)) is equivalent to
0 = 1a (l) + 1b (l), which holds by the definition of a0 (l) and b0 (l).
Note that (omitting some function arguments)
S (a (l)) = S (b (l)) =  ( (l)) ;
S 0 (a (l)) =   
0 ( (l)) (l)
a0 (l)
;
S 0 (b (l)) =   
0 ( (l)) (l)
b0 (l)
:
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Then Assumption 1 is satisfied since
0 > _H (a (l))
m
11
1 + 1
>   0 ( (l)) (l)
m
0 < _W (b)
and these inequalities hold by the assumption in equation (11). The second-order
condition for utility maximization is implied by Assumption 1.
The simulation in Section 2 uses this proposition to compute the Nash equi-
librium. The social optimum is computed using an iterative procedure, where
the derivative of the departure schedule a0 (l) is given by a sixth-order polyno-
mial and parameters of this polynomial are found to maximize the average utility
of drivers. Note that regular sorting is not imposed in the computation of social
optimum. This simulation has a maximum speed drop of 60%, which satisfies as-
sumption (11) and leads to a situation in which the social optimum is not regularly
sorted.
The simulation in Section 3 is based on the simulation in Section 2 with a few
modifications. First, the threshold trip length separating car drivers and transit
users is calculated numerically. This is feasible due to the sorting of departures
within car drivers and transit users. Departure and arrival schedules for transit
users are computed directly. The speed for the marginal car driver is calculated
appealing to sorting. The departure and arrival schedules for car drivers with
longer trip lengths are computed by integrating the differential equations for a0
and b0 in Proposition 1.
In Section 4, the location of scheduling preferences is heterogeneous with a
uniform distribution on the interval [ 1; 1]. The slope of the speed-density re-
lationship is varied across simulations to produce different levels of congestion.
Given a speed profile, the departure schedule for drivers is computed using the
first-order condition for utility maximization. Then the speed profile is updated
given the departure schedule and this is iterated until convergence. The second-
order condition is verified at convergence for all simulations. Then the simulations
do not rely on regular sorting and they are hence valid even if regular sorting does
not result.
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D The marginal utility of travel time
In order to compare changes in travel times to changes in utility, it is useful to
have an expression for the marginal utility of travel time. So we would like to
consider the marginal utility associated with an increase in travel time for a trip
beginning at time a and ending at time b. However, both the departure time and
the arrival time are flexible, so we need to decide how they both change as travel
time increases.
First, travel time is b  a such that a and b are related by b0   a0 = 1 as travel
time increases.
The first-order condition for utility maximization, h (a) =S (a) = w (b) =S (b),
states that the marginal utility associated with increasing distance is the same at
the beginning and the end of the trip. Differentiating this and solving leads to
a0 =

_w   _S (b)


_h  _S (a)

 

_w   _S (b)
 :
We use this expression also for trips that are non-optimally timed, since this main-
tains the difference between the marginal utilities associated with increasing dis-
tance. Differentiating gross utility, u (a; b; 0) =
R a
0
h (s) ds +
R 0
b
w (s) ds, under
these conditions leads to the following marginal utility of increased travel time:
u0 (a; b; 0) = (h (a)  w (b)) a0   w (b)
=
h (a)

_w   _S (b)

  w (b)

_h  _S (a)


_h  _S (a)

 

_w   _S (b)
 :
Specialize this to exponential utility rates (10) to find that the marginal utility of
increased travel time is
u0 (a; b; 0) =  ea0
e 1a

1   _S (b)

+ e1b

1 + _S (a)


1   _S (b)

+

1 + _S (a)
 :
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